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KEEP Perspective May 24, 2002
KEEP is pleased to see the peer review process
underway for Nicholas C. Crawford (2002), “Site Evaluation and Design
Assistance for the Proposed Kentucky TriModal Transpark Preliminary Report
(Based Upon Existing Data Only)”, CCKS (Center for Cave and Karst Studies,
Western Kentucky University), herein referred to as the Preliminary Report. The gravity of this situation is underscored by the
continuing involvement by the geology and cave science community in discussing
the still-emerging problems regarding the proposal to site a 4000-acre heavy
industry TriModal Transpark, with possible airport, on the sinkhole plain of
central Kentucky. While these peer review contributions are welcome at
this time, KEEP anticipates that this is just the latest phase of the detailed
and massive scrutiny and public attention that will continue to keep this
situation in the spotlight. In fact, scientific perspectives were first brought
to bear on the Transpark proposal in 1999, but were ignored by the ITA
(Inter-Modal Transportation Authority). On May 8, 2001, scientists and
concerned citizens issued of a number of letters and documents that were sent
to the attention of the ITA, numerous public agencies, and local governments.
Please see the Appendices to this KEEP Perspective for the texts of some of
these documents and letters, and of additional studies that contribute to
scientific understanding of the Central Kentucky Karst. Even a brief perusal of these sources will indicate
that the present literature review, with its proposed research plan, is wholly
inadequate to address the concerns raised several years ago and continually
since then. At this time, KEEP will confine itself to providing
additional comments from four distinguished members of the cave science
community, and a bulleted list of its concerns regarding the shortcomings of
the Preliminary Report and the proposed Transpark project. Please be advised that KEEP will be regularly issuing
Perspectives. These will contain input
from a distinguished array of experts, on the socio-economic, cultural, legal,
and environmental concerns that are intensifying regarding the proposal to site
a Transpark on central Kentucky’s sinkhole plain between the Barren River and
Mammoth Cave National Park. Four authorities were asked these
questions by KEEP: Can you rule out the possibility that
the Transpark will damage Mammoth Cave? If not, what is the risk to Mammoth
Cave? If not, what studies must be undertaken
to assess the risk to Mammoth Cave? Statement by John W. Hess, Ph.D.
It
is very unlikely that that a 4000 acre industrial park can be built near
Oakland on the Sinkhole Plain 6.8 miles from the Turnhole Bend Spring
groundwater basin with no risk to Mammoth Cave. As you know, I spent a great
deal of my Ph.D. dissertation trying to understand the hydrology of the Central
Kentucky Karst. Steve Wells was working in the area at the same time. Jim
Quinlan then built with a lot of effort on our work to produce his drainage maps.
The drainage divide between the Graham Spring and Turnhole Spring basins is
complex and can not be accurately represented by a simple line on a map.
Drainage divides can move laterally depending on groundwater water levels and
water inputs. Therefore, it is possible for contaminants from the industrial
park to reach Mammoth Cave National Park endangering the cave ecosystem.
Investigations would have to focus on defining the drainage divide under
various hydrologic conditions from drought to floods. Art Palmer’s point
concerning the vadose zone would also have to be studied under differing
hydrologic conditions. John W. Hess, Ph.D. Jack Hess 355 Indian Peaks Trail West Lafayette, CO 80026-8896 303-666-8615 - H 720-890-0742 - FAX Jack Hess is Executive Director of the Geological Society of
America and Vice President of the GSA Foundation. Before assuming the helm of
GSA in December 2001, he was on leave from the Desert Research Institute
working as a Legislative Fellow for U.S. Senator Harry Reid (D-NV) working on
science and technology issues. At the Desert Research Institute, he was Vice
President for Academic Affairs and Executive Director of the Division of
Hydrologic Sciences. An expert in karst and arid zone hydrology, he and his students
have worked in addition to the United States, the Middle East, Africa, South
America, and England. He also serves on the boards of the Karst Waters
Institute and the Boy Scouts of America. Hess earned a Bachelor of Sciences degree in Geosciences and
a Ph.D. in Geology from The Pennsylvania State University. He attended the
Stanford Executive Program at Stanford University. Jack began his association with GSA in 1969 when he became a
student member. He has been active in the GSA’s Hydrogeology Division,
including serving as its Chair. He is also a member of the American Geophysical
Union, American Water Resources Association, Geochemical Society, International
Association of Hydrogeologists, National Speleological Society, and Sigma Xi. Statement by Stephen G. Wells,
Ph.D.
Industrial
parks should be located “off the sinkhole plain” in my opinion, but such
regional landscape planning is rarely the driving force given local economics. I
appreciate Tom Brucker’s kind thoughts about my research over 30 years ago
(hard to believe), but I am sure that more detailed work by Quinlan’s group is
more accurate. However, with that preface and based upon 30-year old research,
my answer to your question is NO, I could not state with certainty that an
industrial park would not impact the Turnhole Spring basin. The complications
in the drainage divide in this region must be understood as it reflects a
complex history of hydrologic piracy of waters from the Graham Springs to the
Turnhole Bend area. And as you point out, the complexity is manifested by
backflooding depending upon the flood stage and groundwater dynamics. My
interpretation of this region was that the boundary between the Green River and
the Barren River watersheds has been dynamic and changing over time, and will
most likely remain this way due to the steeper hydrologic gradients established
by piracy. Given the implications of siting the industrial park in an area that
is hydrologically and geologically complex and its impact on Mammoth Cave, I cannot
imagine why anyone would not support a more detailed study. Although my support
may mean little, I will do whatever I can to push for a scientific study (over
differing hydrologic conditions) to resolve the issue! Makes me realize the opportunity at hand and
lost when we worked to get the Nature Conservancy to recognize the significance
of the headwaters and recharge systems to Mammoth Cave. Stephen G. Wells, Ph.D. President Desert Research Institute Sephen G. Wells, Ph.D., President, Desert Research Institute, University & Community College
System of Nevada, 2215 Raggio Parkway, Reno, NV 89512 sgwells@dri.edu,
Fax: 775-673-7421 or 702-895-0496, Work: 775-673-7311 or 702-895-0406. Currently Dr.
Wells is President of the Desert Research Institute (DRI), an autonomous
nonprofit division of the University and Community College System of Nevada
(UCCSN), reporting to the UCCSN Chancellor and ultimately to the Board of
Regents. The President is the chief executive officer of an approximately $31
million per year not-for-profit organization that conducts unique and highly
specialized scientific research from the State of Nevada to throughout the
world. DRI is one of the world’ s largest multidisciplinary environmental research
organizations with approximately 400 scientists, technologists, and other
support staff. The President oversees two state of the art facilities in both
Las Vegas and Reno where activities are directed from three multidisciplinary
research divisions (Atmospheric Sciences, Earth and Ecosystem Sciences, and
Hydrologic Sciences) and two interdisciplinary centers (Center for Arid Land
Environmental Management and Watershed and Environmental Sustainability). One
of DRI’ s principal missions is the effective utilization of research to
support economic and technological development in Nevada, and as part of this
mission, Dr. Wells is responsible for the development of the Dandini Research
Park. In addition, Dr. Wells works with the Board of Trustees of the DRI
Research Foundation to promote the mission and vision of DRI. Primary
Research Interests of Dr. Wells Geomorphology
and Quaternary geology of arid and semiarid regions in the southwestern United
States; geomorphic and hydrologic responses to Quaternary climate change;
landscape evolution in tectonically active areas and in volcanic regions;
application of geomorphology to land management, hazardous waste disposal, or
natural hazards. He has authored and coauthored approximately 60 peer-refereed
journal articles and edited six volumes in
these
scientific areas. His M.S. thesis was the first to detail the history of the
hydrogeologic boundary between Turnhole Spring (Green River) and Graham Springs
(Barren River). Statement by Richard A. Watson,
Ph.D.
1) Can you rule out the possibility that the Transpark
will contaminate Mammoth Cave? On theoretical grounds, no event that is
not logically impossible (e.g., square circles cannot exist) can be said
absolutely not to be possible. So of course we cannot rule out the possibility
that the Transpark will contaminate Mammoth Cave. On geomorphologic grounds,
the greatest fallacy or untruth propagated by supporters of the Transpark is
that Mammoth Cave is uphill, so no contaminants will flow in that direction. In
fact, the Mammoth Cave is at the same elevation as the Transpark. Small
openings, from microscopic size to immense cave passages, form along the joints
and bedding planes of this limestone. Saying that the limestone between the
Transpark and Mammoth Cave forms a barrier is like saying that a cellar is
sealed except for the fact that there is an open one-inch gap all around the
edges of the door. Moreover, as has been demonstrated many times by
observations in the field, when heavy rains raise the Green River and the
Barren River to their highest flood crests, water backs up in Mammoth Cave to
much higher levels than that. These levels are well above the top of the
supposed barrier described by proponents of the Transpark. Climatologically speaking,
it is highly probable (remember, nothing is certain in science) that the
world's climate is changing rapidly and drastically. The Arctic Ice Sheet is
melting, which could cause massive changes in the oceans' currents, and the
Antarctic Ice Sheet is caving into the oceans, which could cause ocean levels
to rise greatly. Some studies show that past climatic changes from glacial to
inter-glacial ages (we are living in an inter-glacial age that began about
10,000 to 15,000 years ago) can take place in merely a few hundreds or even a
few tens of years. Some of us may live to see such a drastic change. One
possible consequence is greatly increased summer temperatures and winter rains
in the Central Kentucky Karst. This is a long view from a human standpoint, but
Transpark plans are developed on a long view. Increased temperatures and more
rain in the Central Kentucky Karst mean more erosion on the surface and more
cavern development and water circulation underground. 2) What is the risk to Mammoth Cave? It is obvious from the above
that the risk to Mammoth Cave of developing a Transpark with all its production
of pollutants constitutes a high risk to Mammoth Cave. 3) What further studies
should be undertaken to assess the risk to Mammoth Cave? In my estimation, past studies
are adequate to demonstrate the high risk to Mammoth Cave. The general
constitution of the limestone, the development of caves, and underground
circulation in the region is fairly well known. Anybody who lives in the region
knows (without any geological training) the dangers of collapse in a karst
limestone region. Further studies are always helpful and welcome, of course,
and if I were to undertake such studies, I would concentrate of tracing in
great detail the underground circulation of water in the Central Kentucky
Karst, particularly during times of high rainfall and flood. Richard A. Watson, Ph.D. Richard Watson, Ph.D. Philosophy, Professor Department of
Philosophy, Washington University, fields of specialization Epistemology and
Philosophy of Science; M.S. Geology,
Fellow AAAS, Research Associate, Washington University Department of Earth and
Planetary Sciences, fields of specialization Karst Geomorphology and
Pleistocene Climatology. PREFERRED ADDRESS: PROFESSIONAL ADDRESS: 756 Harvard Avenue Dept. of Philosophy St. Louis, MO 63130 Washington University phone:
314-862-7646
St. Louis, MO 63130 rawatson@artsci,wustl.edu phone:
314-935-6670 fax: 314-935-7349 Statement by Thomas C. Barr, Ph.D.
I am Thomas C. Barr,
professor emeritus of biological sciences at the University of Kentucky. For
nearly half a century I have investigated cave faunas in Kentucky, Tennessee,
and adjacent states. I spent about 30 years investigating the very rich fauna
of the Mammoth Cave system, with more species of troglobites (species found
only in caves) than any other North American cave, and one of the biologically
most significant cave systems in the world. In the words of David Culver and
Boris Sket, internationally known biospeleologists, Mammoth Cave is one of the
most important “hot spots of subterranean diversity” in the world. It is incredible that there
should even be a question of building an extensive, pollutant-generating
industrial park on the ecologically vulnerable surface of the Pennyroyal
plateau less than 7 miles from headwaters of Mammoth Cave National Park. This
huge cave system and its remarkable fauna is a world wonder and ought to be
universally recognized as Kentucky’s greatest natural resource treasure, just
as Tennessee and North Carolina recognize the irreplaceable uniqueness of the
Great Smoky Mountains. Mammoth Cave is
not uphill from the proposed Transpark, it is geologically level and squarely
in the path of any contaminated flooding groundwater. Harm to Mammoth Cave’s fauna
cannot only not be ruled out, in reality it is highly probable that with each
major flooding of the ground water level, more and more pollution from the
Transpark will mix with waters of the Graham Spring basin and thus the Turnhole
basin in the Park. I enjoyed knowing Jim Quinlan, hydrologist employed by the
National Park Service during my study of the Mammoth Cave fauna. He presented
very clear evidence that the karst basins on his maps showed different flows in
times of high levels of groundwater, when upper level routes became available
to change the boundaries of the basins. We often discussed the consequences of
this overlapping between karst basins. One very significant consequence was the
possibility of pollution being transferred from one basin to another. What sort of pollution is
the Transpark likely to generate? Oil,
gasoline, grease spills; heavy metals like cadmium, lead, and chromium, all
deadly poisons in ionic form. Dilution of these toxins by floodwaters does not
provide much hope for survival of cave creatures, especially the larger ones
like the blind cavefishes and the blind crawfishes. In the past 25 years it has
been discovered that these larger species grow extremely slowly; a 5-inch blind
crawfish may be 30 or 40 years old, and similar ages apply to the cavefishes.
Species of fish or crawfish living at the surface might tolerate low levels of
heavy metals, but these long-lived cave species are exposed for 10-20 times as
many years to the same pollutants. Their mechanisms for handling the heavy
metals (exoskeleton, metallothioneins) begin to break down, and they will die,
not in a spectacular simultaneous kill, but one by one in a slow, gradual
series of deaths as heavy metal accumulations rise to levels they can no longer
cope with. Living creatures cannot be replaced once they are killed off by
industrial pollution, and a great scientific and educational heritage has been
lost, if extinction is allowed to occur because of greed. You might say, “Well, you
can’t prove that the cave fauna would be harmed by the Transpark.” True, but must we kill what we are trying to
preserve to demonstrate that we were right?
I contend it is not worth the risk, and that risk is very considerable.
We ought not to accept it. Thomas C. Barr, Ph.D. Professor Emeritus, T.H. Morgan School of Biological Sciences, University of Kentucky, Lexington,
Kentucky 40506. KEEP’s Updated List of Concerns Regarding
Shortcomings of the Preliminary Report and the Proposed Transpark
Project The primary losses to be
incurred as a result of the Transpark development would be to the resources and
citizens of the Graham Springs Basin, and to Warren County, Kentucky taxpayers. Contamination and
Pollution Concerns
·
Is the Graham Springs
karst basin so heavily polluted that it should be abandoned to the same fate as
the Lost River karst basin? Various
studies in isolation have been cited to indicate that pesticides and
agricultural chemicals can be found in the Graham Springs basin discharge. One
study indicates the presence of Atrazine, an endocrine disruptor, which poses
an extreme hazard to karst biota. There is no data to support the assertion
that the Graham Spring groundwater basin is polluted beyond recovery. How does
its water quality compare with that of nearby karst basins? What authority has
claimed that the Graham Springs basin water is good enough to drink without
treatment? Isn’t this a “straw man” argument, when in fact the National
Speleological Society recommends against drinking ANY untreated water in ANY
cave in the U.S.A.? How can one explain
the Watershed Watch report that the Graham Springs basin water quality is good
compared to other regional basins? Is
it true that the Graham Springs basin water quality cannot be made potable by
treatment because of the hazardous pollutants?
Isn’t it true that one of the best future sources for groundwater for a
growing Bowling Green is the Graham Springs basin? The obfuscation of these
pollution issues in the Preliminary Report is unfortunate. ·
The principal catchment
measures proposed for Transpark stormwater and hazardous materials spillage is
the liberal use of geomembrane material. A primary problem is that the life of
such membranes is stated nominally as 15 to 20 years, and this longevity
estimate is based on the use of impermeable membranes in landfills. Landfills
by design have a limited capacity – generally 15 or 20 years – at which time
their capacity has been reached and they are covered over by another membrane
and thus “sealed”. Accounts of membrane failures are legion, as evidenced by an
internet search on the subject. It can be assumed that at the Transpark site,
leachate overflows and leaks, and spillage from membrane-protected wastewater
holding ponds, drainage systems, and demolition landfills will go directly into
the karst aquifer. If not immediately, this leakage will occur later. The assertion
that expensive and short-lived membrane liner use will permanently block
groundwater pollution is, simply, absurd. ·
Hartland Golf Course
lakes are cited as typical ecologically sound alternatives to draining
Transpark stormwater directly into sinkholes. In fact, each lake has a limited
capacity. When the water storage volume is exceeded, as in heavy rains, the
lake will spill over and run into the nearest sinkhole or overflow its
geomembrane liner. In either case the effect of the lake is as a temporary
retardant to stormwater flow, and its only other volume reduction is through
lawn sprinkling and evapotranspiration. When was a competent assessment made of
the drainage behavior of the Hartland lakes during high rainfall conditions? ·
Bowling Green’s practice
of disposing of stormwater by channeling runoff to sinkholes and through
hundreds of “injection wells” is deplored as inadequate by the Preliminary
Report. Indeed, the practice is illegal, as was its predecessor practice of
channeling untreated sewage into the Lost River cave passages. The engineering
solution called for in the Preliminary Report will do nothing except introduce
a short time delay in the transit time for runoff to become groundwater. The
retardation will have no effect on restricting or eliminating pollution through
ground treatment. ·
At least a dozen states
and the FAA and EPA prohibit airports to be located within 5,000 or 10,000 ft
of a landfill. The reason is that airports, as do landfills, contribute to
groundwater pollution. A demolition landfill is located near the end of the
proposed Transpark airport runway. There is concern, based on field-observed
evidence, that this landfill drains directly into the cave system beneath the
Transpark site and is likely a source of groundwater pollution. The so-called
membrane has been observed in tatters allowing odoriferous waste material to be
observed in the cave. ·
Alluviation of the cave
system beneath the proposed Transpark site has been documented. One effect of
this sedimentation is to further constrict waterflow through the karst system,
causing higher stage rises within the cave system, and subsequently spreading
pollution spatially. Water wells in the vicinity of the Transpark are likely to
be adversely contaminated by contaminant spread during times of high water. It
has been documented that turbid (cloudy) water from area water wells is a
characteristic of karst contamination experienced during heavy rainfall events. ·
When sanitary or storm
sewage lines are sheared off as a result of collapse, as at the Bowling Green
collapse site located at Dishman Lane, their contents empty directly into the
karst aquifer with no chance for barrier interception and capture. Without
numerous and expensive check valves, the entire project sewage system could be
diverted into the aquifer in the event of a catastrophic collapse downgradient
of the Transpark. ·
The standard recovery
and remediation procedures in documented cases of holding pond or lagoon
contamination (lined or unlined) are to drill a series of interceptor wells
around the perimeter. Pump and treat methods generally fail because of rapid
dispersal of contaminants. Attempted cleanup ranges from $10 million to
hundreds of millions of dollars. In the case of failure of Transpark lakes, it would
be an insurmountable problem to drill interceptor wells in this karst terrain.
(See www.epa.gov/epaoswer/hazwaste/ldr/mine/npl.pdf
for 24 pages of comprehensive accounts of occurrences of groundwater
contamination and subsequent cleanup costs.) As the CCKS previously reported in
the case of a collapse of a holding pond of animal manure in a karst area, such
contamination is simply impossible to remedy. It is surprising to see sanguine optimism
about the effectiveness of catching contamination at the proposed Transpark
karst site, when less extensive karst regions have such a dismal record of
failure, such as the Lost River karst a few miles away. Instability and Collapse Concerns
·
Almost all federal,
state, and municipal environmental protection authorities define karst terrain
as unstable: “ ‘Unstable area’ means a location that is susceptible to natural
or human induced events or forces capable of impairing the integrity of some or
all of the landfill structural component responsible for preventing releases
from a facility. Unstable areas can include poor foundation conditions, areas
susceptible to mass movements, and karst terrains.” Any project for which a
geomembrane liner might seem to offer a solution is subject to these conditions
of instability. (Source: http://www.rules.state.ut.us/publicat/code/r315-301.htm)www.rules.state.ut.us/publicat/code/r315-301.htm). ·
Rules almost
universally prohibit or recommend against the use of geomembrane liners in
projects in unstable areas because mechanical and structural shifting, such as
from sinkhole collapse, will tear membrane liners and dump the retained
contents into the karst system below. It is astonishing and simply junk
engineering to recommend the use of geomembrane liners for extensive use in the
Transpark project when such a practice is clearly contraindicated in the
literature. While the question of longevity of the liner (10 to 20 years
estimated) has been raised by KEEP, the fact is that the strength of the liner
material is likely to decrease through time. The added weight of water in
wastewater holding ponds will certainly contribute to cover collapse. Also not
mentioned in connection with unstable terrain is the effect of seismic activity
in the Mammoth Cave region. Earthquakes do occur in this region
(http://www.eas.slu.edu/Earthquake_Center/SEISMICITY/cus1800-1983.html). The
Wilbur Smith Associates study for the ITA indicated that “plastic soils” are
present at the Transpark site. Plastic soils, unconfined by bedrock structure,
are a principal cause of regolith collapse. “Protected” soils can dry out and
become granular, subject to flow. A geomembrane would not necessarily keep a
regolith plastic soil from groundwater penetration, because the wetting and
flow of regolith plastic soils may be caused by water rising in the karst
drainage cutters beneath a protected or unprotected surface. If located beneath
geomembranes, catastrophic collapse may be expected. ·
The Dishman Lane
collapse is a prediction of other collapses to come, should the Transpark be
built. Several troubling issues are illustrated by the catastrophic collapse of
the Dishman Lane extension in Bowling Green:
a.
The first is a collapse
of credibility. It has been asserted that the city of Bowling Green was able to
alter the course of the proposed Dishman Lane right of way as a result of
scientific geophysical detection of a cave. (Source: Crawford, et al.) The use
of microgravity equipment was touted as saving an expensive collapse. It has
also been asserted that a map existed of State Trooper Cave beneath the
proposed right of way. When Dishman Lane began to dip, and a driver reported
the failure, KEEP announced that this was a karst collapse. An authority
countered that it was no such thing, ascribing the dip to the failure of the
road contractor to properly compact the soil of the roadbed. When the road
collapsed precipitously and catastrophically, trapping several cars, the
authority stated that it was not a collapse of the Lost River Chert (as KEEP
had warned), but that the chert lAyr was 70 ft below the surface and could not
have caused the collapse. A geologist with the Commonwealth of Kentucky
examined the site and pronounced it a cave bedrock ceiling collapse. The
authority asserted in the press that the geologist was “flat wrong”. Instead
the collapse was ascribed to the shifting of an ancient breakdown in the cave.
Later examination revealed that the bedrock ceiling of the cave had collapsed.
Did the advanced geophysical techniques reveal the danger? Was the road altered to avoid the cave? Did the city pay for scientific and
engineering advice it subsequently ignored? Who is at fault? Considerable economic loss is represented by
this collapse: a new bank office is located on a dead end street. An expensive
church next to the collapse is showing the effects of unstable structure. The
new road appears to be a direct route to the newly commercialized Lost River
Cave. A partially constructed business building stands idle while many
decisions are being made, fingers pointed, and blame shifted. Were it not so
unfortunate, this is only the latest example of the “Ignore Karst, Build Now,
Fix Later” attitude and practice in the Bowling Green area. b.
What did the city of
Bowling Green learn from this collapse?
Apparently nothing. A subsequent collapse on Cemetery Road has created
some press commentary (Bowling Green Daily News, March 13, 2002) by road
construction workers in recent weeks. Since that time the collapse was filled
in literally overnight, possibly in violation of the Bowling Green city
ordinance prohibiting the filling of sinkholes without a permit. “Ignore Karst,
Build Now, Fix Later.” c.
The third issue is an
instructive lesson as to why collapse sites cannot be detected economically.
Various microgravity and electrical resistivity methods are described in the
Preliminary Report as scientific methods for use in avoiding collapse
occurrences. Yet, a careful reading of the case histories of each of the
described applications reveals the following sequence: The methods detect
“something”. The anomaly must then be probed by expensive exploratory drilling.
If a void is detected, a downhole camera is lowered and photos taken. If the
void (cave) is large, the flash lighting may fail to illuminate the walls of
the cave. Then a 30-inch hole is bored and a cave explorer lowered to assess
the cave. Then an engineering decision must be made as to whether to construct
an expensive reinforced concrete mat to bridge the suspected collapse area,
move the road or structure, or to supercompact the area and hope that more
collapse is not induced. In other words, detection is not “easy,” nor is
remediation anything except expensive. Clearly, development on this collapse-prone
karst would be ruinously expensive. It is oxymoronic to use the term
“economical construction on karst,” which in fact is code for “stick taxpayers
with the repair cost.” d.
Another question raised
by the Dishman Lane collapse is: how extensive is the collapse area? The evidence from the field is clear that
collapse-prone sinkholes do not have a single conduit leading downward,
although this is how sinkholes are simplistically depicted in the diagrams
proffered in the Preliminary Report to show how sinkholes can be plugged. The
WSA Environmental Assessment (2001) contained several generalized diagrams of
how crushed rock, geofabric sheets, and standpipes could plug sinkholes. These
are inadequate even as theoretical remedies, because the sinkholes in the
Graham Springs Basin break from the bottom upward in a cone shape that is wider
at the bottom than at the top. In
addition, the bedrock walls of sinkholes leak laterally along nearly all
bedding partings. As any farmer knows, sinkholes cannot be plugged, yet the
Preliminary Report claims great ease in handling sinkhole collapses, and offers
diagrams from an engineering handbook. What makes all general diagrams useless
is that the vertical and horizontal openings beneath a sinkhole form in
clusters of multiple routes for water to be conducted underground. An
examination of road cuts in the Ste. Genevieve and St. Louis limestones reveals
multiple vertical channels, often close together. Expensive repairs are the
rule, not the exception. ·
KEEP is concerned that a great deal of
semantic juggling is being offered in the Preliminary Report and elsewhere
regarding regolith arch collapse sinkholes vs. solution sinkholes vs. collapse
sinkholes, when the simple fact is that cover collapses are collapses. Regolith
arch collapse (called soil piping elsewhere) is described in the Preliminary
Report as the prevalent type of sinkhole in the Warren County area. The
distinction between solution sinkholes and collapse sinkholes is an old one
contained in some geomorphology textbooks. It is inadequate because of the
artificial distinction of what are in reality continuous causes and processes.
The regolith arch collapse is a relatively new term, but is it a distinctive
“type” of sinkhole? The answer is no.
Three processes are involved in sinkhole development, and all three are present
in every sinkhole: 1. Runoff and groundwater drain through horizontal and
vertical openings in the vadose zone (zone of percolation), 2. Rock surrounding
drainage channels is removed through solution , mechanical collapse, and
transport, and 3. Soil above and surrounding the collapsed bedrock is removed
by transport . Normally, sinkholes develop slowly, although they can be
revealed literally overnight. However, when drainage is altered through parking
lot, road, drainage swale construction, and construction pad leveling,
sinkholes collapse because the concentrated forces of transport accelerate to
remove rock and soil rapidly. Many sinkholes are found to open at construction
sites around Bowling Green, and dozens of such collapses are not unusual. We
can expect the same set of “surprises” as the Transpark site is developed.
Widespread collapse is inevitable, unavoidable, and sure to be a budget buster.
·
KEEP is fascinated by
the Preliminary Report’s proposal to use experimental super compaction of
regolith arches as a way of solving sinkhole and collapse problems at the
proposed Transpark site. Supercompaction is an experimental method employed at
construction sites in Florida in sandy karst terrains. As explained in the
Preliminary Report, a 70-foot crane creeps across the landscape dropping a
10-ton weight every few feet. The crushing weight supposedly collapses shallow
regolith arches and compacts the soil into a stable plug. It is then argued
that the karst problem is thus solved, because all the sinkholes and potential
sinkholes are pounded down. There are three unaddressed problems that render
this a “junk engineering” solution: 1. Where does the fill material come from
to cover the depression created? 2. Doesn’t the force of pounding loosen
adjacent rocks, enlarge drainage channels, and rearrange soil? 4. Some shallow voids and arches may be
compacted, but deep cavities will be missed. In most construction, fill
material comes from borrow pits or cuts made to level structural sites,
runways, and drainage ditches. Removal of soil for this purpose at the
Transpark site would alter the natural drainage and expose additional hidden
regolith arches. A pounding force of the intensity necessary to collapse
regolith arches would loosen already-weakened grikes and cutters adjacent to
the pounded areas. KEEP suggests that supercompaction is in fact a shortcut to
collapse disaster. ·
The Preliminary Report
concentrates on the hope that collapse-prone areas of the karst terrain can be
detected and be “remediated” easily and cheaply. This hope has never been
realized in Warren County, nor any other mature karst area. The most expensive
collapses are those in cracked and settling buildings, streets, runways,
holding ponds, sewage systems and utility lines. Contractors who bid on
construction projects in karst areas generally build into their contract
provision for cost overruns for unexpected site problems. Contingent funds are
demanded from the developer. Often, insurance underwriters will charge
excessive premiums or may refuse to indemnify contractors who build projects on
karst. Unstable areas of mining in Kentucky have similar financial problems.
Contractors may be expected to pad their bids to cover many “unknowns”;
unfortunately, the inexperienced contractors may ignore the uncertainty and go
bankrupt during construction. Either scenario is a bad bargain for the
bondholders or the taxpayers to whom the bondholders look for satisfaction. It
is significant that the FAA estimated that the proposed Transpark airport would
cost $150 million, instead of the $27 million estimated by the ITA. This cost
difference does not take into account the added cost of construction on karst!
Here are KEEP’s concerns regarding the
costs of construction on karst: a.
It would be expensive
to build on this karst initially and in repair and maintenance costs incurred
later. Does the ITA intend to remain as landlord to fix these expensive
projects as concrete cracks and new sinkholes open, as spills of toxic
materials take place? Or is this a
“caveat emptor” situation – let the buyer beware? b.
How would tenants of
the new Transpark find insurance underwriters willing to issue affordable
casualty policies to cover their businesses?
·
In the Preliminary Report, is the Bristow
Plain mislocated and misidentified as an “ideal site” for an airport
runway? The so-called Bristow Plain was
the designation of two individuals, Jim Quinlan and Ralph Ewers, writing a
brief descriptive entry in a field trip road log for a geological meeting. They
were describing a set of distinctive features – few sinkholes, low relief, a
flat sub-plain developed on the Lost River Chert . The prototype area for these
features lies directly north of Smiths Grove, about four miles northeast of the
Transpark site. The Preliminary Report stretches this description southwest to
encompass the Transpark site, although the Transpark site exhibits the rolling,
sinkhole-pocked moderate relief of most of the Pennyroyal Sinkhole Plain. The
Lost River Chert at the Transpark site is in fact covered, and also breached by
numerous sinkholes. The significance of this “stretch” is to characterize the
Transpark site as having relatively few sinkholes, low relief, and the “chemical
resistivity” of the Lost River Chert. In fact, 100% of the Transpark site is
drained by sinkholes. Their number is immaterial, and is an artifact of the
contour interval selected for the topographic map. In fact, not any of the
discussion about the Lost River Chert -- its supposed strength or lack of it --
is evidenced by field data or drill log data, or any field checking. What is
the strength of ANY of the rock beds?
Is anecdotal evidence of fragility or strength sufficient to qualify
this discussion as “science”? In fact,
no geologic cross section of the proposed Transpark site or even the Graham
Springs basin has been prepared. The opinions rendered from looking at an
inadequate geologic map cannot lend confidence to any claim that the site is
stable terrain. Spillover, Leakage, and Seepage of
Groundwater Concerns ·
The karst groundwater
basins drained by Graham Springs and Turnhole Spring are dynamic and not static
hydrologic systems. The Quinlan and Ray groundwater basin study (1981), while a
landmark at its time, does not purport to measure and integrate the data
available from today’s modern multipoint dye tracing techniques with higher
sensitivity and capture of additional critical groundwater parameters. It is
true that the water well level data gathered from hundreds of wells is
independent of the stream tracing data. Furthermore, the water well level data
was gathered over many months and is not representative of a specific moment in
time. The Preliminary Report uses this data to prepare a scenario that, if
true, suggests that the Graham Springs basin does not spill over during high
rainfall into the Turnhole Spring basin. KEEP has concerns with this
presentation, as follows. ·
Is Figure 13 of the
Preliminary Report a true portrayal of the dynamics of the two groundwater
basins? The answer is no. The water
well level data was used by Quinlan and Ray to extrapolate a piezometric
low-water surface, expressed by blue contour lines on their groundwater map. They
used a dotted line to indicate their estimated approximate position of the
crest of the low water divide. This dotted line is located east of the Bon Ayr
Anticline nose. The fact that the contour line is dotted indicates uncertainty
of the location by the investigators. The Preliminary Report then superimposes
on this low water level readings from various well stage recorders at various
times. The connection of the sequential high stage well level data is used to
argue that the flow direction of all the water during high stage conditions is
invariably toward Graham Springs, and by inference, never toward the Turnhole
Spring basin. ·
The above conclusion
rests on missing evidence and unfounded assumptions: 1. It assumes there is
little or no flow of groundwater below the top of the saturated (phreatic)
zone. In fact, as pointed out by White, Pohl, Watson, and Brucker (1970), the
lowest known level of the Mammoth Cave system is 30 ft below the present pool
stage of the Green River at 421 ft MSL. Deep well data is not available to
determine whether this base level may extend headward in the basins, whether it
is manifest only as contained conduit flow, or whether there are extensive open
partings in the bedrock to permit deep circulation between apparent basin
boundaries. 2. The Preliminary Report assumes that the Bon Ayr Anticline is an
impermeable structural barrier “like a mountain range”, and it prevents vadose
or phreatic groundwater circulation between the basins. In fact, the Bon Ayr
Anticline is developed in cavernous rocks, the St. Louis and Ste. Genevieve
limestones. It contains tubes, canyons, and vertical shafts in addition to
bedding partings. The role of Crumps Cave near the divide is a puzzle that
requires investigation. It is well within the region of the top of the low
water zone of saturation and the high stage well level data. According to some
authorities, it is a Mammoth Cave trunk passage-size conduit that is highly
modified by breakdown and vertical shafts, and its wall scallop marks show
evidence of basin piracy. Is it an overflow route that diverts drainage during
high rainfall? A field check is required. 3. The Preliminary Report assumes
there is no shale or confining bed (aquitard) that can channel water in several
directions rather than simply direct it toward Graham Springs. 4. The
Preliminary Report assumes that accurate data as to direction of waterflow may
be derived from well level data, which might be true if there is an impermeable
structural divide. It can be argued (but not conclusively proven without data)
that the crest of the high water divide shifts laterally in a zone between
staging well locations. 5. The Preliminary Report assumes that stream tracing
data from low flow conditions remains consistent during high flow conditions.
This is far from proven, and in fact the several spillover examples of
bifurcated drainage cited in the 18-scientist letter suggest (but do not prove)
that hydrologic communication between basins is a fact. In summary, the
acceptance of the hypothesis that no spillover into Mammoth Cave is possible
rests on missing evidence, and is based on assumptions for which there are
reasonable alternative explanations. ·
The role of vertical
shafts has been ignored in the Preliminary Report. Brucker, Hess, White (1972)
describe vertical shafts in the Mammoth Cave region as being high energy
supercritical laminar flow vertical conduits that short-circuit surface and
horizontal drainage through the entire cave system. Many of the most active
vertical shafts, silo-like interior openings, are located at or near the edge
of the Big Clifty sandstone of the Chester Escarpment. However, remnant
vertical shafts dot the entire Sinkhole Plain landscape, and are left over from
the erosion, slope retreat, and removal of the Mississippian and Pennsylvanian
rocks. These vertical conduits serve to unite all the horizontal drainage into
a single three-dimensional network of openings. Vertical shafts have numerous
abandoned drains, which, in times of flooding, serve as overflow routes for
drainage. The presence of vertical shafts in the Bon Ayr Anticline can easily
account for the integrated interior drainage in that region. ·
Water stages in the
caves regularly rise two or more times the stages of the base level rivers. The
Preliminary Report argues that the Barren River would have to rise above its
historic high stage in 1913, and flood downtown Bowling Green, before it could
possibly back up water from 440 ft. MSL at the Transpark site to 480+ ft. MSL
at the crest of the divide. KEEP argues that only a 40+ ft rise is necessary to
surmount the 480+ ft divide crest, and that a 50 ft rise in the Barren River
would be accompanied by a 100 ft stage rise in the cave system beneath the
Transpark site. The 100 ft rise is recorded in the cave stage data for Mill
Cave and Wolf Sink. A cave is a constricted flow system. Its discharge capacity
is limited by the geometry of downstream conduits and the discharge
distributary system at or below the water table. This is why the Graham Springs
discharge volume cannot be measured, because the geometry of its distributary
system is unknown. Cave passage breakdowns within the zone of discharge create
new constrictions (Brucker, 1966). As has been pointed out, the Preliminary
Report cites agricultural alluviation of sediment as further restricting the
water carrying capacity of the cave system. This suggests that system flood
backups (temporary gradient reversals) will increase over time unless the
present sediment and breakdown restrictions are flushed out of the caves. The
argument about the Barren River never flooding downtown Bowling Green is the
approximate equivalent of the following imaginary scenario: A homeowner’s
toilet overflows. A call to the plumber brings the response, “Your toilet
cannot overflow – to do so it would require the Barren River to flood downtown
Bowling Green!” The homeowner’s
reaction is likely to be incredulous, and so is that of KEEP. ·
The Preliminary Report
casts doubt on the Quinlan and Ray finding that the top of the saturated zone
at the Transpark is at 440 ft MSL. A leveling traverse into Mill Cave and Wolf
Sink is cited to reveal a true elevation of 416 ft. The simple explanation of
this apparent discrepancy is that the cave rivers run in a trough in the
piezometric water surface contours. The cave streams form the base level and
surrounding groundwater surface, as indicated in well log stage data, is
pitched toward the cave streams. The question of how fast the contours move
upward in response to rises in the cave stream, is part of the unresearched
dynamics of the system. However, the presence of turbid water in local wells
during high water suggests turbulent flows and therefore rapid adjustment of
the water level contours to positions above the cave stream levels. ·
Does the divide crest invariably rise in
response to base level rises in the Barren and Green rivers? The Preliminary Report says that it does,
and cites this as evidence that spillover is not possible between basins. In
truth, sufficient data is not available to answer this argument. The rainfall
gages are far apart in this region, and the staging wells are few in number.
What is required for certainty is a more dense network of flowmeters, level
gages, and weather stations to record storm pulse events, particularly in the
vicinity of the conjectural divide. This finding is consistent with the
18-scientists letter asking for a hypothesis-based study using storm pulse data
taken over several years. ·
The issue of
groundwater flow in the epikarst, raised by Palmer, is dismissed without
adequate consideration. Epikarst is the vadose zone (zone of percolation) of
underground drainage. In the 18-scientist letter Palmer reported lateral water
flow perched along dippping beds above the water table (up to 20,000 ft) based
on geologic surveys of now-inactive flow routes. Flow contrary to the assumed regional dip of the rocks was
detected over distances of hundreds of feet where the local dip itself was
reversed. The Preliminary Report points out that the geologic map is based on
the underlying Chattanooga Shale (600 ft down) and the bottom of the Big Clifty
sandstone. The Preliminary Report suggests that water drains down dip in these
basins. Dip direction is not a necessary structural control of groundwater flow
in this region. Palmer regards seepage from the Graham Springs basin as a more
important threat to Mammoth Cave than the possibility of high water spillover. KEEP Conclusions: No Cause for Reassurance
or Trust
KEEP is far from reassured regarding the scientific
efforts planned to determine the suitability of this site for the proposed
4000-acre heavy-industry Kentucky TriModal Transpark and possible airport. Overall, our assessment is that the planned scope of
work and literature review are dismayingly inadequate. These do not even rule
out threats to Mammoth Cave, let alone to the Barren River. We are grateful to
the peer reviewers for their volunteer efforts. KEEP is concerned that the Preliminary Report, while
useful in understanding some of the existing data, does little except to
enthusiastically advocate development of the Transpark. Further, the
Preliminary Report dismisses some strong arguments and omits important data.
Its conclusions and recommendations are neither science nor engineering KEEP is confident that the data reaffirms the threats
to Mammoth Cave and to the Barren River, and that the studies necessary to
dispel doubt about damage have not been conducted. KEEP is concerned that such
studies will not be carried out, as the ITA appears determined to press ahead
with its land acquisition, construction plans, and earth moving, regardless of
the dangers. KEEP concludes that it is not prudent to invest
public money in such a risky and uneconomical project as the Transpark. KEEP Karst
Environmental Education and Protection Coalition P.O. Box 8,
Oakland, KY 42159, Tel. 270-780-3533 KEEP Steering Committee:
Fred Anderson; Deborah Bledsoe; Joanna Blubaugh; John Blubaugh; Roger W.
Brucker; Gayla Cissell; Kenneth Kuehn, Ph.D.; Hilary Lambert, Ph.D.; Michael
May, Ph. D.; Ouida Meier, Ph.D. KEEP
Perspective, May 2002
List
of Appendices
Appendix A
Brucker, Roger W., 1966.
“Truncated cave passages and terminal breakdown in the Central Kentucky Karst,”
National Speleological Society Bulletin
28:4, 171-178.
Poulson, T. L., and W. B.
White, 1969. “The cave environment: Limestone caves provide unique natural
laboratories for studying biological and geological processes.” Science 165:3897, pp. 971-981. September
5. White, William B., R.A.
Watson, E.R. Pohl and R.W. Brucker, 1970. “The Central Kentucky Karst.” Geographical
Review 60, pp. 88-114. Brucker,
R.W., J.W. Hess and W.B. White, 1972.
“Role of vertical shafts in movement of ground water in carbonate
aquifers.” Ground Water 10:6, pp. 5-13. November-December. Appendix B Palmer, A., January 26,
2001. Letter to Don Vitale. Palmer, A., May 2, 2001.
Letter to ITA for inclusion in May 8 hearing. Brucker, R.W., et al., July 26, 2001. 18-scientist
letter sent to Dan Cherry. Poulson, Thomas L., August
1, 2001. Letter sent to Dan Cherry. White, William B., 2001.
“Commentary on Environmental Assessment for the Proposed Kentucky Trimodal
Transpark.” Appendix C KEEP responses to the
ITA’s “Environmental Assessment for the
Proposed Airport Kentucky TriModal Transpark, February 16, 2001,” prepared by
Wilbur Smith Associates.
Brucker,
R.W., May 2001: “Response to Environmental Assessment for the Proposed Airport
Kentucky TriModal Transpark dated February 16, 2001.” Lambert Hopper, Hilary and
Deborah A. Bledsoe, May 2001, “Response to Appendices, Environmental
Assessment for the Proposed
Airport Kentucky TriModal Ttranspark
dated February 16, 2001.” Appendix D
Brucker, R.W., 2002. Block
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